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College campuses are highly vulnerable to infectious disease outbreaks, and there is a pressing 
need to develop better strategies to mitigate their size and duration, particularly as educational 
institutions around the world reopen to in-person instruction in the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Towards addressing this need, we applied a stochastic compartmental model to quantify 
the impact of university-level responses to past mumps outbreaks in college campuses and used it 
to determine which control interventions are most effective. Mumps is a very relevant disease in 
such settings, given its airborne mode of transmission, high infectivity, and recurrence of outbreaks 
despite availability of a vaccine. Our model aims to simultaneously overcome three crucial issues: 
stochastic variation in small populations, missing or unobserved case data, and changes in disease 
transmission rates post-intervention. We tested the model and assessed various interventions using 
data from the 2014 and 2016 mumps outbreaks at Ohio State University and Harvard University, 
respectively. Our results suggest that in order to decrease infectious disease incidence on their 
campuses, universities should apply diagnostic protocols that address false negatives from 
molecular tests, stricter quarantine policies, and effective awareness campaigns among their 
students and staff. Our model can be applied to data from other outbreaks in college campuses and 
similar small-population settings. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 1 
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has forced school closures around the world (1), and 2 
universities in the United States and elsewhere are designing plans for safe reopening (2, 3). This 3 
is a challenging task, as college campuses provide ideal breeding grounds for infectious disease. 4 
Students live in close quarters, pack into lecture halls, share food and drinks in the dining areas, 5 
and engage in intimate contact. Outbreaks in these settings can spread very quickly. Indeed, a 6 
meningitis outbreak took place at Princeton University in March 2014, eventually claiming the life 7 
of one student. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) reported the attack rate of 8 
the disease on Princeton’s campus to be 134 per 100,000 students – 1,400 times greater than the 9 
national average (4).  10 
A recent string of outbreaks on college campuses involves mumps, once a common 11 
childhood viral disease. After introduction of the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine in 1977 12 
and the two-dose MMR vaccination program in 1989, the number of mumps cases in the US 13 
plummeted by 2005. But, despite a vaccinated population, there has been a recent resurgence of 14 
mumps, with a steep jump from 229 cases in 2012 to 5833 cases in 2016 (5). Although a typically 15 
mild disease in children, up to 10% of mumps infections acquired after puberty can cause severe 16 
complications, including orchitis, meningitis, and deafness. Furthermore, a majority of recent 17 
mumps cases have occurred in young adults who had received the recommended two MMR doses. 18 
This suggests that vaccine-derived immunity wanes over time, unlike natural immunity – 19 
protection acquired from contracting the disease – which is permanent. Lewnard and Grad estimate 20 
that 33.8% of young adults (ages 20 to 24) were susceptible to mumps in 1990, in contrast to the 21 
52.8% susceptible in 2006, as vaccinations have replaced contraction as the source of immunity 22 
(6). The temporary immunity from vaccines strengthens the argument for strict containment as a 23 
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critical line of defense amidst an outbreak. In the case of COVID-19, even with the availability of 24 
several vaccines (7), the challenges associated with their wide and quick distribution (8), the 25 
substantial asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic transmission of the disease (9), and the possibility 26 
of new viral strains with higher transmissibility (10) provide further support for such approaches. 27 
The spread of mumps at Harvard University in 2016, and extensive public health measures 28 
and documentation, presents a rare opportunity to closely examine an outbreak on a college 29 
campus. Between January 1 and August 31, 2016, 210 confirmed mumps cases were identified in 30 
the Greater Boston area, with most detected at Harvard University. Mumps is a highly contagious 31 
disease with the potential to travel quickly and pervasively on a crowded college campus. Some 32 
of the most notable mumps outbreaks on college campuses occurred in Iowa (11), Indiana (12), 33 
and Ohio (13). But, whereas mumps spread rapidly at Ohio State University (OSU) in 2014 and 34 
the University of Iowa in 2006 and 2016, Harvard employed a number of interventions that may 35 
have helped mitigate spread of the disease and contain it over just a few months (14). The 36 
possibility of distinct viral strains resulting in different outbreak dynamics between schools can be 37 
safely dismissed, as it was shown by application of genetic epidemiology methods (15) that all 38 
mumps outbreaks in the US since at least 2006 have been likely caused by the same mumps lineage, 39 
mumps virus genotype G. 40 
The successful containment at Harvard motivates us to explore varied intervention 41 
strategies, given the relative costs of prevention. Even if the use of a booster MMR vaccination is 42 
proven theoretically to reduce infection and thus potentially prevent outbreaks (6, 11), it is unlikely 43 
that universities with limited resources will proactively invest in a third dose. A rough cost analysis 44 
conducted by Harvard University Health Services (HUHS) showed that, while the total mumps 45 
care expenses for Harvard was approximately $75,000, the cost of providing a third MMR dose to 46 
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every member of the Harvard community (at $83 per vaccination) was $1.7 million (16). Therefore, 47 
at least in the short term, a third MMR dose cannot be the only answer to handling mumps 48 
outbreaks; we must consider more immediate solutions and interventions.  49 
In order to understand the effectiveness of interventions aimed at containing an outbreak 50 
on a college campus, we constructed an epidemiological model to simulate the dynamics of mumps 51 
on such a population and quantify the impact of various interventions. Most epidemiological 52 
models have at least one of three flaws: they cannot handle random fluctuations in a small 53 
population, require complete data without unobserved or missing cases, or do not accommodate 54 
time-varying infection or recovery rates as a result of dynamically changing interventions. The 55 
modified stochastic susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model presented in this 56 
paper addresses these three issues. We developed this model within the framework of a Partially 57 
Observed Markov Process (POMP), which has been applied to introduce structural stochasticity 58 
into epidemic models (17). We fit model parameters on case data for Harvard’s 2016 mumps 59 
outbreak provided by the Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH). We compared it 60 
to data from OSU, one of the few universities that had extensive publicly available data through 61 
the CDC.  62 
In applying our model, we found that each of the interventions employed by HUHS -- email 63 
awareness campaigns, more aggressive diagnoses where clinical symptoms alone were enough to 64 
result in quarantine, and strict isolation of suspected cases -- were crucial in reducing the size and 65 
duration of the outbreak. In particular, Harvard’s policies drastically increased the reporting rate 66 
of infection and shortened the time a person remains infectious in a susceptible population, relative 67 
to the baseline. As a result, one mumps case at Harvard infected less than two susceptible 68 
individuals on average, and much less once aggressive diagnosis was in place, compared to cases 69 
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at non-residential schools like OSU, in which one mumps case infected an average of six 70 
susceptible individuals. However, the OSU data suggests that self-isolation could be effective, if 71 
adopted rigorously by students. The conclusions from this paper could guide future responses to 72 
infectious disease outbreaks on college campuses. Without effective measures in place, highly 73 
transmissible diseases like mumps, meningitis, and now COVID-19, spread in these environments 74 
at much faster rates than in the overall population and can lead to serious health complications. 75 
Simple interventions that ensure most cases are detected, treated, and separated from susceptible 76 
individuals make a significant difference. 77 
78 
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2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 79 
 80 
2.1 Harvard mumps outbreak  81 
2.1.1 Data 82 
The mumps outbreak at Harvard began in February 2016, when six students reported onset of 83 
parotitis to HUHS. For the next three months, the number of cases continued to rise, until finally 84 
plateauing in late May and early June. There were two waves of the outbreak – one occurring in 85 
the month of March and a larger one occurring in mid-April – totaling 189 confirmed and probable 86 
cases (Figure 1). Confirmed cases are those with a positive laboratory test for mumps virus. 87 
Probable cases are those who either tested positive for the anti-mumps IgM antibody or had an 88 
epidemiologic linkage to another probable or confirmed case (18, 19). The majority of these cases 89 
received the recommended two doses of MMR (20).  90 
We use data provided by MDPH, which documented every mumps case between 2015 and 91 
2017 at schools across Massachusetts (21). This data includes demographics of the patient (gender, 92 
age, county, and institution), symptoms and vaccination status, date they reported their symptoms 93 
and the date of symptom onset, and lag time between the date of symptom onset and admission to 94 
a medical clinic. 95 
 96 
2.1.2 Interventions 97 
Harvard University employed three main interventions: (i) an email awareness campaign, (ii) more 98 
aggressive diagnoses, and (iii) strict isolation of infectious persons.  99 
First, between February and May 2016, HUHS sent six different emails to Harvard students, 100 
employees, and colleagues with information on the gravity of the outbreak, recommendations on 101 
how to prevent transmission, and instructions on how to identify mumps. This raised awareness 102 
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throughout the campus. Particularly at the peak of the outbreak, roommates, resident deans, and 103 
athletic coaches all played essential roles in reporting potential cases of mumps, so that few cases 104 
likely went undetected and untreated by HUHS (18, 19).  105 
Second, Harvard acted vigorously to treat and isolate anyone suspected of mumps 106 
throughout the outbreak. Initially, due to the disease’s non-specific symptoms and less extreme 107 
manifestation in vaccinated people, HUHS used positive mumps PCR tests as a necessary ground 108 
for diagnosis. Later, on recommendation from the MDPH, HUHS stopped automatically ruling out 109 
those with negative PCR results, given that false negatives were quite frequent in vaccinated 110 
individuals and that some individuals reported their infection to the clinic belatedly. In outbreaks 111 
among two-dose vaccine recipients, mumps virus was only detected in samples from 112 
approximately 30-35% of case patients if the samples were collected within the first three days 113 
following onset of parotitis (22). Anyone who entered HUHS displaying clinical symptoms of 114 
mumps was now deemed infected and infectious. This change in the diagnosis protocol took place 115 
on April 15 2014, day 61 of the outbreak (19). 116 
Third and perhaps most notably, Harvard isolated most confirmed or probable cases of 117 
mumps. While many universities simply suggest self-isolation in one’s room or dormitory (which 118 
leaves roommates and friends highly susceptible to the disease), Harvard removed anyone with 119 
clinical symptoms of mumps from the population. Of the 230 total cases at Harvard between 120 
February 2016 and November 2017, 96 were isolated in alternate housing on campus, while 110 121 
were isolated off-site. Although a person remains infectious with mumps for five days, Harvard 122 
isolated patients for six days for additional measure (18).  123 
Harvard also used a variety of smaller techniques to contain the disease. For instance, water 124 
fountains with a weak upward flow were repaired in late March when it became apparent that 125 
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students were directly touching the fountain with their water bottles or mouths (19). In this study, 126 
we only considered the first three larger-scale interventions in our models. Figure 1 shows a 127 
timeline of the interventions as well as periods when the population was fluctuating (such as during 128 
spring and summer break). Around two weeks after HUHS improved its criteria for diagnosis in 129 
mid-April, there was a steep decline in the number of new cases. These interventions were possible 130 
thanks to the ample resources that Harvard has at its disposal, which may not be available at other 131 
universities. Nevertheless, this situation makes Harvard an ideal testing ground for interventions 132 
that could not be deployed elsewhere, at least without solid proof of their efficacy. Thus, we 133 
quantify the effects of the three main interventions (awareness campaign, aggressive diagnoses, 134 














Figure 1: The daily number of new mumps cases (probable or confirmed) at Harvard and the 
timeline of school vacations and control interventions employed by HUHS between February 
and June 2016. Both probable and confirmed cases display clinical symptoms of mumps, but 
only confirmed cases have a positive PCR result. HUHS sent multiple emails over the course of 
the outbreak, raising awareness about the spread of mumps. Additionally, in mid-April, HUHS 
began more carefully diagnosing mumps, rather than automatically ruling out those with 
negative PCR tests. The isolation policy is not shown because it occurred continuously 
throughout the entire outbreak.  
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2.2 Ohio State University mumps outbreak 149 
2.2.1 Data on the outbreak 150 
In 2014, a large outbreak of mumps occurred in central Ohio, with the majority of cases linked to 151 
OSU in Columbus. The outbreak began in February 2014 and peaked in early April with 96 cases 152 
in one week. By summer and early fall, the number of cases had dramatically dropped and 153 
stabilized (13). We therefore restrict our analysis of the outbreak to the time between Week 1 and 154 
Week 40 of 2014, in which there were a total of 528 cases (Figure 2). We obtained this data from 155 
CDC’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (23). One drawback of the data is that the cases 156 
are reported weekly, making our analysis and parameter estimations less precise. Furthermore, we 157 
cannot guarantee that all the cases in this dataset are linked to the university itself, but we know 158 
from news reports that most cases in Ohio occurred on campus during the first half of 2014 (13). 159 
The proximity in time to the Harvard outbreak and the differences in response detailed below make 160 
this a good dataset to compare to. 161 
 162 
2.2.2 Characteristics of the response 163 
We were unable to acquire data directly from OSU, and thus the exact timeline and range of 164 
interventions administered over this period are not known. We learned through online searches 165 
that advisories were published by the university, notifying students of the issue and how to prevent 166 
its spread. One notice published by OSU’s medical center reads: “Stay at home for five days after 167 
symptoms (salivary gland swelling) begins (required by Ohio law OAC 3701-3-13, (P)); avoid 168 
school, work, social gatherings, and other public settings” (24). These advisories were distributed 169 
since March 2014 (25), and local news outlets also started reporting the outbreak earlier in the 170 
 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted December 31, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.07.31.20166348doi: medRxiv preprint 
10 
 
month (26). It appears, however, that like most affected universities, OSU did not formally isolate 171 





2.3 Epidemiological POMP model  177 
The epidemiology of mumps can be captured by a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Removed (SEIR) 178 
compartmental model: after exposure, individuals go through a latent non-infectious period, 179 
followed by an infectious phase (27). Infectious individuals are removed from the transmission 180 
process either by recovery or isolation, after which they become immune. Compartmental models 181 
simplify the mathematical modeling of infectious diseases; however, they assume access to fully 182 
observed disease data. In reality, not all mumps cases are reported, and latent mumps carriers 183 











Awareness campaing & news reporting
Outbreak at Ohio State University
Figure 2: Number of weekly mumps cases in Ohio (particularly Ohio State University) between 
January and November 2014. There were 528 cases during this time period, with most occurring 
between Match and July. The dotted line in the last week of March indicates the intervention 
consisting in awareness campaign by OSU, as well as local and national news reports about the 
outbreak. 
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model with a Partially Observed Markov Process (POMP) model (28). This allows us to combine 185 
the simplicity of compartmental models with a probabilistic framework for the underlying 186 
dynamics and the observed data. POMP models require the specification of a process model that 187 
describes stochastic transitions between the (unobserved) states of the system (in this case, the 188 
SEIR compartments), and a measurement model where the distribution of observed data (e.g.: 189 
confirmed cases) is expressed as a function of the unobserved states. The stochasticity introduced 190 
in the SEIR dynamics makes our model better suited to describe small populations, such as college 191 
campuses, where random fluctuations can be significant in relation to the size of the population. 192 
We describe the process and measurement models below. 193 
 194 
2.3.1 Process model 195 
The process model, defined as a stochastic SEIR model, provides the change in true incidence of 196 
mumps at every time point. We add parameters that induce random fluctuations into the population 197 
and change the compartments’ rates of transfer in response to interventions. We do this by using 198 
probabilistic densities for the transition of state variables. Moreover, although disease dynamics 199 
are technically a continuous Markov process, this is computationally complex and inefficient to 200 
model, and so we make discretized approximations by updating the state variables after a time step, 201 
𝛿. Due to the varying granularity of the observed data (daily and weekly), we used two different 202 
time steps: 𝛿" = 2.4	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 for Harvard and 𝛿- = 12	ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 for OSU. The system of discretized 203 
equations is shown in Equation 1, where 𝐵(𝑡)  is the number of susceptible individuals who 204 
become exposed to mumps, 𝐶(𝑡) is the number of newly infectious cases, and 𝐷(𝑡) is the number 205 
of cases that are removed from the population: 206 
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𝑆(𝑡 + 𝛿) = 	𝑆(𝑡) − 	𝐵(𝑡)	207 
	208 
𝐸(𝑡 + 𝛿) = 	𝐸(𝑡) + 	𝐵(𝑡) − 	𝐶(𝑡)	209 
	210 
𝐼(𝑡 + 𝛿) = 	𝐼(𝑡) + 	𝐶(𝑡) − 	𝐷(𝑡)	211 
	212 
𝑅(𝑡 + 𝛿) = 	𝑅(𝑡) + 𝐷(𝑡)	213 
	214 
𝑆(𝑡) + 	𝐸(𝑡) + 	𝐼(𝑡) + 	𝑅(𝑡) = 	𝑁	215 
	216 
Equation 1 describes how the sizes of the four compartments (susceptible, exposed, 217 
infectious, and removed) change between (𝑡, 𝑡 + 𝛿) . The model further assumes that the 218 
population size 𝑁 remains constant at every time point. We added inherent randomness to our 219 
model by setting 𝐵(𝑡), 𝐶(𝑡), and 𝐷(𝑡) as binomials. If we assume that the length of time an 220 
individual spends in a compartment is exponentially distributed with some compartment-specific 221 
rate 𝑥(𝑡) , then the probability of remaining in that compartment for an additional day is 222 
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥(𝑡)) and the probability of leaving that compartment is 1 − 	𝑒𝑥𝑝	(−𝑥(𝑡)): 223 
𝐵(𝑡) ∼ 	𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝑆(𝑡), 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜆(𝑡	)), where 𝜆(𝑡) = 	𝛽(𝑡) E(F)
G
 224 
𝐶(𝑡) ∼ 𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝐸(𝑡), 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝜎	))	225 
	226 
𝐷(𝑡) ∼ 𝐵𝑖𝑛(𝐼(𝑡), 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾(𝑡)	))	227 
	228 
 The force of infection, 𝜆(𝑡), is the transition rate between the susceptible and exposed 229 
classes at time t, and can be expressed as 𝛽(𝑡) E(F)
G
, where 𝛽(𝑡) represents the transmission rate of 230 
the disease. The removal rate between the infectious and removed compartments at time t is given 231 
by 𝛾(𝑡), and transition rate between the exposed and infectious classes is 𝜎. Therefore, 𝛾(𝑡)JK 232 
represents the mean length of time a person is infectious before being removed from the population 233 
(either because of intervention efforts or natural recovery), while 𝜎JK represents the mean length 234 
of time a person stays in the latent stage. With this notation, we are implicitly assuming that the 235 
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while the duration of the latent stage is constant and determined by the physiopathology of the 237 
disease. We will justify these assumptions for Harvard and OSU next, as well as provide explicit 238 
formulas for 𝛽(𝑡)	and  𝛾(𝑡). 239 
Leaving aside the unlikely possibility of change in pathogen’s infectivity, the transmission 240 
rate 𝛽(𝑡) essentially depends on the frequency of exposure events. In the case of Harvard, its 241 
nature as a residential campus would lead to significant decreases in student population, and 242 
therefore exposures, during school vacations. Exposure at OSU, a non-residential campus, is 243 
arguably less affected by vacation breaks. Another potential cause for reduction in exposures is 244 
awareness campaigns resulting in the adoption of preventive behaviors by students. Both Harvard 245 
and OSU adopted such campaigns, in the former, implemented as emails regularly sent out by 246 
HUHS recommending personal hygiene and testing in case of symptoms compatible with mumps; 247 
in the latter, in the form of advisories posted around campus and online, advising self-isolation to 248 
those students who presented symptoms. Furthermore, due to the scale of the mumps outbreak in 249 
Ohio, it received local and national news coverage, particularly in connection with OSU. 250 
Anecdotal evidence (i.e.: conversation with students) and, most importantly, the fact that HUHS 251 
emails were throughout the outbreak, make us conclude that emails were not particularly effective. 252 
On the other hand, news coverage in the case of OSU could have led to additional awareness by 253 
students and encouraged some to self-isolate. We argue that self-isolation results in lowering of 254 
transmission rate, not shortening of the removal time, because it is not perfect quarantine and 255 
people can still interact and become exposed, albeit at a lower frequency. Based on these known 256 
facts and our interpretation of them, we propose the following transmission rate 𝛽"(𝑡) for the 257 
Harvard model:  258 
𝛽"(𝑡) = 	𝑝𝛽"	,			𝑡0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡1	𝑜𝑟	𝑡 ≥ 𝑡2		 259 
	= 	𝛽"	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒																		 260 
 
(3) 
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Here, t0 and t1 represent the starting and ending dates for the spring break (March 12-20 2016), 261 
and t2 the beginning of the summer recess (May 26 2016). The constant 𝛽"  is the baseline 262 
transmission rate during normal class term, and the parameter p is a number between 0 and 1 that 263 
accounts for the reduction of student population on campus during the school vacation. In the case 264 
of OSU, we propose:  265 
𝛽-(𝑡) = 	𝑤𝛽-	,			𝑡 ≥ 𝜁		 266 
													= 	𝛽-	𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 267 
 268 
In this equation, 𝛽- the baseline transmission rate, w is a constant lower than 1, and 𝜁 the time 269 
when students began to self- quarantine. Based on publication of public health advisories and 270 
local news, we set this time as the last week of March 2014 (week 12). Since Harvard’s 271 
quarantine was in effect through the entirety of the outbreak, we did not incorporate a similar w 272 
coefficient to the corresponding 𝛽"(𝑡) equation for Harvard. 273 
 The removal rate 𝛾(𝑡) can also be affected by interventions and personal behaviors. We 274 
know that HUHS diagnosis protocol changed on day 61 of the outbreak at Harvard, resulting in a 275 
shorter average removal time since clinical presentation of symptoms alone was enough to result 276 
in strict isolation of suspected cases. Thus, we propose the following 𝛾"(𝑡) for Harvard:  277 
𝛾"(𝑡) = 	𝑞𝛾"	, 𝑡 ≥ 𝜏		 278 
						= 	 𝛾", 𝑡 < 𝜏 279 
Here, q is a constant greater than 1 and 𝜏 is the date when the new criteria was implemented (April 280 
15, 2014). The constant 𝛾"  is the baseline removal rate reflecting the impact of the original 281 
diagnosis protocol. In the OSU model, on the other hand, we assume a constant recovery rate 𝛾 282 
equal to the population average for mumps, since infected individuals self-isolate at home. This 283 
would not result in a strict quarantine but in a reduced contact rate with susceptible individuals, 284 





 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licenseIt is made available under a 
 is the author/funder, who has granted medRxiv a license to display the preprint in perpetuity.(which was not certified by peer review)preprint 
The copyright holder for thisthis version posted December 31, 2020. ; https://doi.org/10.1101/2020.07.31.20166348doi: medRxiv preprint 
15 
 
Finally, it is necessary to estimate the basic reproduction number, 𝑅0, which equals the 286 
expected number of secondary cases produced by an infectious person in a completely susceptible 287 
population (27). 𝑅0 measures the initial growth rate of an outbreak and so, if it is less than 1, then 288 
the infection will die out and there will be no epidemic. For our stochastic SEIR model, this 289 
constant can be expressed as 𝑅0 = T
U
  (29). Meanwhile, the time-dependent effective reproduction 290 





, but because 𝑆(𝑡) 	≈ 	𝑁, we can simplify this expression 291 
to 𝑅V(𝑡) 	≈ 	
T(F)
U(F)
. Both the basic and effective reproduction numbers allow us to understand the 292 
strength of an outbreak. 293 
 294 
2.3.2 Measurement Model 295 
Although it is impossible to directly record the number of people that are susceptible, exposed, 296 
infectious, and removed directly, the MDPH and CDC data tells us the number of observed cases 297 
per day. The mean number of observed cases per day is the true number of cases multiplied by the 298 
reporting rate 𝜌 (𝜌 < 1). However, rather than simply denoting the observed number of cases as a 299 
binomial distribution, we account for greater variability in the measurements than a binomial 300 
distribution expects, since college populations are “small” (comparted to cities and larger 301 
administrative units) and more affected by random fluctuations (30). Thus, the number of observed 302 
cases, 𝑦F, given the number of true cases,	𝐶(𝑡), can be best modelled by an overdispersed binomial 303 
distribution defined as a discretized Normal random variable:   304 





The parameter 𝜓 handles the increased variability in a small population. If 𝜓 = 0, the 308 
variance in our measurement model simplifies to the variance for a binomial distribution.  309 
 
(6) 
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2.3.3 Final POMP Model 311 
The process and measurement models define our final POMP model. For each time point, the 312 
process model generates the number of new cases based on binomially distributed counts. The 313 
measurement model then estimates the observed number of cases based on the true number of 314 
cases and reporting rate. The free parameters in our POMP models for Harvard and OSU that need 315 
to be estimated from the data are the following: (i) 𝛽" and 𝛽-, baseline transmission rates, (ii) p 316 
and w, decrease in transmission rate at Harvard and OSU due to vacation and self-isolation, 317 
respectively, (iii) 𝛾" baseline removal rate at Harvard (iv) 𝑞, increase in removal rate due to the 318 
updated HUHS diagnosis protocol, (v) 𝜌"  and 𝜌-,  case reporting rates, (vi) 𝜓"  and 𝜓- , 319 
overdispersion coefficient representing additional variability in the populations.  320 
 321 
2.3 Fixed parameters 322 
In addition to the free parameters to be estimated from the observed case data, our models also 323 
include a number of fixed parameters, shown in Table 1, whose values can be inferred directly 324 
from previous knowledge or available information. As mentioned earlier, we chose 𝜏 = 61 days 325 
and 𝜁 = 12 weeks because those points in time at Harvard and OSU correspond to the introduction 326 
of the interventions that we hypothesized to be impactful in the dynamics of the respective 327 
outbreaks. Dates t0, t1, and t2 for the spring and summer vacations at Harvard are available online 328 
(31). We set the rate between the exposed and infectious classes and the recovery rate to 𝜎 = K
Ke
  329 
and 𝛾 = K
f
, respectively, since the average latent period and recovery time for mumps are known 330 
to be 𝜎JK = 17 days and 𝛾JK = 5 days (6). Finally, we set the effective population size at Harvard 331 
𝑁" = 20,000 × 0.53 = 10,600  people based on records of Harvard’s enrollment and 332 
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employment, and Grad and Lewnard estimation of susceptibility to mumps among college-age 333 
adults due to immunity waning (6). Similarly, we use an effective population for OSU given by 334 
𝑁- = 60,000 × 0.53 = 31,800, leveraging the total enrollment for the 2013-2014 academic year 335 
reported in OSU’s statistics website (32). 336 
 337 
Symbol Description Value Units Source 
𝜏 Date of intervention at Harvard 61 day Harvard records on interventions (19) 




day Harvard archived academic calendar 
(31) 
𝜁 Date of intervention at OSU 12 week  
𝜎JK Duration of mumps latent period 17	 day Lewnard and Grad (6)  
𝛾JK Duration of mumps recovery period 5 day Lewnard and Grad (6) 
𝑁"	 Effective population at Harvard 10,600	 — Harvard records on population size 
(20) and mumps susceptibility among 
college-aged individuals (6) 
𝑁- Effective population at OSU 31,800 — OSU’s statistical summary (32) and 
mumps susceptibility among college-
aged individuals (6) 
 338 
 339 
2.4 Maximum likelihood estimation of free parameters 340 
In order to obtain estimates of the free parameters in our models, we pick the parameter values that 341 
maximize the log likelihood of the observed data given each model. Within the POMP framework, 342 
we can perform fast maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) via Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) 343 
techniques (28). SMC allows us to calculate the likelihood of the data more efficiently by applying 344 
the Markov property to generate paths in parameter space that sample the likelihood surface. We 345 
performed 100 searches from random parameter guesses, each converging to a unique value, and 346 
we then took the maximum over the 100 runs the final point estimates. We did this using the pomp 347 
package version 2.8 (33) for the R statistical software version 3.6.1 (34). In order to calculate the 348 
confidence intervals for each parameter, we selected the top quartile from the set of parameters 349 
Table 1: List of fixed parameters used in mumps transmission model for Harvard and OSU 
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values obtained in the SMC runs, and applied the adjusted bootstrap percentile (BCa) method (35) 350 
with 10,000 bootstrap replicates using the function boot.ci in version 1.3.20 of package boot for R 351 
(36). 352 
 353 
2.5 Intervention analysis 354 
Finally, we performed an analysis of the parameters q and w, which respectively quantify the effect 355 
of what we consider to be the defining intervention at Harvard (aggressive diagnosis) occurring 356 
around day 61 of the outbreak, and the self-isolation awareness campaign at OSU during March 357 
2014. This could allow us to understand to what extent these interventions made a difference on 358 
the trajectory of the outbreak. First, we compared the scenario with the interventions versus a 359 
scenario without the interventions. Controlling for all other parameters, we run two sets of 360 
simulations at the MLEs, with 200 simulations each. The first set of simulations fixed q and w at 361 
the value obtained from MLE, while the second set of simulations set q and w to 1, assuming that 362 
no interventions occurred around day 61 at Harvard and by week 12 at OSU. We then compared 363 
the cumulative number of cases over time for these two sets of simulations, generating a 95% 364 
percentile range from all the simulations in each set. Second, we used this method to determine if 365 
administering the interventions earlier could have lowered the number of cases. For Harvard, we 366 
let the day of the intervention take on values between 1 and 60. Subsequently, we ran simulations 367 
for each of these 60 cases, pulled the final outbreak size from the median simulation, and calculated 368 
the reduction in outbreak size. We applied the same procedure for OSU, in this case varying the 369 
day of intervention between 1 and 11 and calculating the corresponding final outbreak sizes.  370 
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3. RESULTS 371 
3.1 Optimal Parameters of Harvard and OSU Outbreaks 372 
The MLEs of the parameters provide insight into the key characteristics of Harvard’s and OSU’s 373 
outbreak. In general, we observe very good agreement between the observed cases and the 374 
simulated outbreaks using the optimal parameters. The effective reproduction number also reflects 375 
the effects of the interventions at Harvard and OSU in way that’s consistent with our initial 376 
modeling assumptions. The bootstrap sampling method results in narrow 95% CIs.  377 
 378 
3.1.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for Harvard 379 
The results are shown in Table 2. Notably, the baseline removal rate 𝛾" is quite high, indicating 380 
that the initial diagnosis protocol was quite effective at identifying and removing infected students 381 
from the population, but it was further increased after day 61. The reporting rate 𝜌"  is also 382 
remarkably high, which suggests that HUHS was able to identify most of the cases circulating at 383 
Harvard. 384 
 385 
Symbol Description Point estimate 95% CI Units Source 
𝛽" 	 Baseline transmission rate 1.39 (1.29, 1.42) day-1 MLE 
𝛾"  Baseline removal rate 0.85 (0.81, 0.88) day-1 MLE 
p	 Decrease in infection due to vacation 0.11 (0.09, 0.15)  MLE 
q Increase in removal rate  2.8 (2.25, 2.52) — MLE 
𝜌" Proportion of infections reported 0.97 (0.92, 0.95) — MLE 
𝜓" 	 Overdispersion parameter 0.54	 (0.49, 0.53)  — MLE 
𝑅V(𝑡) Effective reproduction number 1.63 normal term 
0.18 during vacation 
0.58 after intervention 





Table 2: List of parameters in the Harvard model that were obtained by MLE or calculated 
using the estimated parameters. 
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We ran stochastic simulations of Harvard’s outbreak using the parameter values from Table 388 
2. Figure 3 shows consistent results across simulations: shortly after day 61 (the time of the primary 389 
intervention), we consistently see a decrease in the number of observed cases. The variability in 390 
the simulations can partly be attributed to the randomness in the stochastic model as well as the 391 
over-dispersion parameter. Variability can also be explained by the MLE of the basic reproduction 392 
number being below 2, which together with the stochasticity built into the simulations, can result 393 
in absence of outbreak, such as in simulation 8, or much smaller outbreaks like in 5, 7, and 9.  394 
The MLE of the parameters, which we obtained by picking the maximum of the log 395 
likelihood over the 100 SMC runs, falls outside the bootstrap 95% CI for q, 𝜌", and	𝜓". However, 396 
the distance between the MLE and the boundary of the CIs is small in these three cases, and we 397 
also run simulations using the bootstrap mean, and all results remained unchanged. 398 
 399 
3.1.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for OSU 400 
The MLEs of the parameters for the OSU model, as well as derived quantities, are shown in Table 401 
3. Here we can see an initial reproductive number of almost 6, much higher than Harvard’s. 402 
However, it eventually becomes lower than 1, which supports our modeling assumptions of an 403 
awareness campaign from OSU, perhaps helped by news reporting about the outbreak, that lead to 404 
effective self-isolation of individuals. 405 
Symbol Description Point estimate 95% CI Units Source 
𝛽- 	 Transmission rate constant 1.19 (1.19, 1.2) day
-1 MLE 
w Decrease in infection due to self-isolation 0.16 (0.157, 1.16) — MLE 
𝜌-  Proportion of infections reported 0.03 (0.029, 0.03) — MLE 
𝜓- 	 Overdispersion parameter 0.38 (0.376, 0.38) — MLE 
𝑅V(𝑡) Effective reproduction number    5.95 initial 
   0.95 after advisory 





Table 3: List of parameters in the OSU model that obtained by MLE or calculated using 
the estimated parameters. 
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As with Harvard, we run stochastic simulations of OSU’s outbreak using the parameter values 408 
from Table 3. The simulated outbreaks are shown in Figure 4, and they replicate the real curve 409 





































































Figure 3: Nine simulations of the final Harvard model evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates. 
Comparisons to the actual data show that many of the simulations (particularly Simulation 1, 2, 3, and 
6) have similar patterns that mirror the shape curve for the observed data.  
Figure 8: Nine simulations of the final OSU model evaluated at the maximum likelihood estimates. All 
of them follow the observed data quite closely. 
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3.2 Earlier intervention decreases outbreak size at Harvard and OSU 414 
The results from the intervention analysis for Harvard and OSU is depicted in Figure 5. By the 415 
final day of the Harvard outbreak (day 130), the simulations without the intervention on day 61 416 
yielded outbreak sizes that were up to four times the size of the actual outbreak (Figure 5A). These 417 
results also indicate that the outbreak would have lasted much longer, if not for these vigilance-418 
increasing strategies. By varying the day of the intervention from 1 to 61, we also obtained a linear 419 
regression between day of intervention and reduction of the outbreak (Figure 5C). The fitness of 420 
the regression is very high (R2=0.96, P<10-9), and quick inspection of the plot reveals that if the 421 
new diagnosis protocol had been implemented within the first 10 days of the outbreak, then no 422 
more than 50 students would have been infected in total at Harvard.  423 
For OSU we observe similar trends. Lack of intervention on week 12 could have resulted 424 
in an outbreak twice as large (Figure 5B). The outbreak size as a function of the intervention week 425 
also shows a strong dependency, but in this case non-linear and best fit with a sigmoid function of 426 
the form 1/(1+eweek-12). Using this transformation, the fit is also very high (R2=0.63, P<0.005), and 427 
we can conclude that intervening earlier would have had a major effect as well: if the awareness 428 
campaigns prompting students to self-isolate had started around week 5 or 6 (rather than week 12), 429 
then it appears likely that the outbreak could have been completely eradicated. 430 
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Figure 5: Panels A and B show the comparison of the cumulative number of cases over time for the 
observed Harvard and OSU data and the range of cases (95% percentile of the runs) in simulations with 
and without interventions, with dotted lines representing the timing of the interventions in each school 
(panels A and B). In panels C and D, the plots show the percentage we expect outbreak size to decrease by 
if the date of intervention had been moved up. There is a significant linear relationship between the time 
and percentage reduction in the case of Harvard, as well as a significant relationship after doing a sigmoid 
transformation of the time variable in the case of OSU. 
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4. DISCUSSION 435 
4.1 Parameter interpretation 436 
The MLEs give us insight into characteristics of the mumps outbreaks at Harvard University in 437 
2016 and Ohio State University in 2014, as measured by their effective reproduction numbers 𝑅V, 438 
intervention parameters q and w, rates of removal 𝛾 , reporting rates 𝜌 , and overdispersion 439 
parameters 𝜓 . At Harvard, 𝑅V  during normal class term was 1.63, which indicates that the 440 
outbreak was growing, even though testing and isolation by HUHS resulted in a baseline removal 441 
time of only  K
l.mf
= 1.2  days. This points to the effectiveness of the quarantine system 442 
implemented by HUHS. However, a small fraction of false negative cases still managed to escape 443 
quarantine and keep the virus under circulation, as indicated by the reproduction number being 444 
higher than 1. The reproduction number goes below 1 during the spring break, which is reasonable 445 
given that most students are away due to the residential nature of the Harvard campus. However, 446 
transmission resumes after the break. It is only after the implementation of the new diagnosis 447 
protocol on day 61, which required isolation if clinical symptoms were present, that had a dramatic 448 
effect on the detection and isolation of positive cases, effectively taking the removal time to less 449 
than 1 day and the reproductive number below 0.6. Thanks to this key intervention, it was possible 450 
to end the outbreak before the beginning of the summer recess.  451 
The estimate of 𝜌 is 0.96, which implies the reporting rate at Harvard was remarkable. 452 
Reasons include the email awareness campaign, a community network – from resident deans to 453 
athletic coaches – reporting students and employees who seemed at-risk, and more aggressive 454 
diagnoses, particularly towards the end of the outbreak. The estimate for 𝜓 is 0.54, suggesting that 455 
the actual data has more variability than expected under the assumed distribution. If 𝜓 had been 456 
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approximately 0, the variance in our measurement model would have simplified to the variance 457 
for a binomial distribution. However, because the 95% confidence interval is (0.5, 0.56) and thus 458 
does not include 0, we justify the modelling decision of representing the number of cases as an 459 
over-dispersed binomial. Demographic and environmental stochasticity (e.g.: a student in the 460 
midst of midterm season may be less likely to report symptoms), as well as the interventions 461 
themselves (e.g.: reporting may increase temporarily after an awareness email) can result in over-462 
dispersion in the number of reported cases.  463 
In the case of OSU, we obtain a much higher reproduction number at the beginning of the 464 
outbreak, near 6, and a very low reporting rate of 3%. Before discussing these results any further, 465 
it is important to keep in mind that we extrapolated OSU cases from state-level reports by the CDC. 466 
Furthermore, we did not have direct access to information about the containment interventions 467 
adopted by the school, as we did for Harvard, so we were only able to make educated guesses 468 
about those possible interventions based on information we found on the web. However, the 469 
internal consistency of the resulting model and the good agreement with the available data, gives 470 
weight to these results. Within our OSU model, we can conclude that self-isolation of students 471 
motivated by the advisories posted by OSU had the intended effect of stopping the outbreak. The 472 
effective reproduction number dips below 1 after March, which is when the awareness campaign 473 
appeared to have started, and also when the outbreak gained local and national prominence due to 474 
news reporting. The low reporting rate is closer to population-wide estimates of this parameter (6), 475 
and is also compatible with a large, non-residential campus where it is harder to reach out to 476 
students as they live scattered around the city. A consequence of this number is that the outbreak 477 
should have been 30 times larger than observed. Since the observed case count is approximately 478 
500, it follows that the total number of cases could have reached 15,000 individuals, which is still 479 
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possible given that the number of susceptible within the school’s student population is over 30,000. 480 
This is still a very significant number, and it is possible that a large majority of these potential 481 
15,000 cases only had mild symptoms. Furthermore, the modeling approximation of closed SEIR 482 
compartments is probably less accurate for OSU given its non-residential nature: students there 483 
have more opportunity to interact with individuals outside of their school, resulting in additional 484 
transmissions that are not captured by our model, and thus affecting the interpretation of 485 
parameters such as the reporting rate. 486 
  487 
4.2 Effect of strict isolation policy vs self-isolation 488 
Arguably the most critical intervention by HUHS was the isolation requirement for confirmed and 489 
probable mumps cases. By comparing the Harvard and OSU outbreaks, we conclude that the 490 
isolation policy led to a smaller average infectious period for Harvard patients. The MLEs for 491 
Harvard and OSU are different for several parameters, most notably basic reproduction number, 492 
reporting rate, and rate of transition from the infectious to removed class. Firstly, OSU’s basic 493 
reproduction number is over four times that of Harvard. Harvard’s isolation policy best explains 494 
this difference because it physically prevented infectious persons from causing multiple secondary 495 
infections, thus suppressing the growth of the outbreak. Secondly, OSU’s reporting rate is 496 
extremely low, at approximately 3% compared to Harvard’s 96%. We do not have access to OSU’s 497 
diagnostic procedures nor do we know the extent of their email awareness campaign, but we 498 
hypothesize that a lack of one or both of these may explain at least a portion of the dissimilarity in 499 
the two schools’ reporting rates. However, the decrease in OSU’s transmission rate we observe in 500 
our model post-intervention is still extremely significant with a sixth-fold reduction, and would 501 
have been a major contributor to help containing the outbreak there. This suggests that compliance 502 
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with easy-to-implement measures such as self-isolation could go a long way towards outbreak 503 
mitigation. Of course, high compliance is contingent on effective educational and awareness 504 
campaigns by the health authorities. 505 
 506 
4.3 Implications of intervention analysis 507 
With the benefit of our intervention analysis, we conclude that aggressive diagnoses decreased the 508 
size of the Harvard outbreak by approximately three-fourths. Furthermore, for every day of 509 
intervention delay, we estimate that the outbreak size would have increased by 1.6 percentage 510 
points, extrapolating the regression line in Figure 5C. Likewise, self-isolation prompted by health 511 
advisories posted by the university reduced the size of the OSU outbreak by half. Given the non-512 
linear dependency between change in outbreak size and timing of intervention (Figure 5D), the 513 
increase would have been even larger in that outbreak. Interestingly, this dependency also implies 514 
that self-isolation in the first weeks of the outbreak can be enough to completely stop spread.  515 
Clearly, a limitation of this analysis is the assumption that everything remains the same 516 
while changing the time of the intervention under consideration. In reality, other factors might 517 
come into play if the outbreak becomes larger or smaller, which in turn could affect the dynamics 518 
of the outbreak as well as the interventions themselves. However, this analysis still provides a 519 
useful hypothetical quantification of the effect of accelerating or delaying interventions designed 520 
to contain the spread of an outbreak and here, as expected, the sooner the interventions are 521 
introduced, the better the outcomes in terms of outbreak size. Of course, existing constraints in the 522 
school’s health system could impede fast interventions. In such situations, our method can be 523 
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useful to perform a cost-benefit analysis of how late an intervention could be made to still have a 524 
significant reduction in the health burden caused by the disease. 525 
 526 
4.4 Conclusions 527 
We constructed and parametrized a POMP model for the transmission of mumps on college 528 
campuses. Unlike other models of infectious disease, which opt for deterministic representations, 529 
our stochastic model is adaptable to small populations and accounts for the noisiness and 530 
incompleteness of case data. Moreover, it incorporates parameters that measures the effect of 531 
interventions implemented after a given point in time. Given the worldwide crisis caused by the 532 
COVID-19 pandemic, such models can be useful to quickly evaluate interventions designed to 533 
contain the spread of SARS-CoV-2 once schools reopen in the U.S. and around the world. 534 
We compared an outbreak at Harvard University, with its various intervention strategies, 535 
to another university outbreak of comparable reported cases at OSU. Importantly, while most 536 
literature today focuses on mumps prevention – such as administering third MMR doses to college-537 
age students – this paper provides quantitative backing for more immediate and less costly 538 
approaches to mitigating the spread of mumps and other infectious diseases, most notably COVID-539 
19. Even with widespread availability of vaccines, outbreaks of highly transmissible diseases are 540 
still a reality, as mumps exemplifies very clearly. In particular, requiring strict isolation if any 541 
symptoms of the disease are presented would significantly reduce transmission and ultimately the 542 
size of the outbreak. Effective awareness campaigns that lead to self-isolation of infected 543 
individuals with mild symptoms can also have a significant effect in containing the spread of 544 
disease and limiting the risk for vulnerable populations. 545 
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4.4 Limitations 546 
Some of our conclusions are likely affected by confounding factors that we cannot control for in 547 
this analysis. For example, the outbreak at Harvard started to subside in late April, not long before 548 
students finish the semester and leave campus, which would decrease the number of potential 549 
infections. The most promising method to determine the exact effect of isolation strategies is 550 
through a randomized control trial. Regarding the differences between OSU and Harvard 551 
parameters, we must be cautious in taking the OSU estimates at face value. Given that the OSU 552 
data consists of weekly reports rather than daily reports of cases, we should expect the estimates 553 
for the parameters to be less accurate. Furthermore, the cases are not solely linked to the university. 554 
Numerous cases in the data occurred in the greater Columbus area, suggesting that the parameter 555 
estimates do not only account for the dynamics of mumps on campus. Lastly, major differences in 556 
housing and campus characteristics could have also contributed to differences between the two 557 
schools; for instance, OSU’s population size is three times that of Harvard, and OSU has larger 558 
dorms than Harvard’s houses. Interventions used at Harvard simply may not have worked as well 559 
at OSU. We were fortunate to have direct access to school administrators who were involved in 560 
the response to the 2016 outbreak to discuss HUHS interventions in detail, but we were not able 561 
to get the same level of detail for OSU’s interventions, as discussed in the main text. More broadly, 562 
lack of publicly available datasets, with the exception of CDC reports on OSU’s outbreak, is a 563 
serious impediment to perform these analyses. Therefore, it will be essential that universities 564 
across the US and globe actively share data for comparative analysis, to identify the best 565 
intervention strategies to protect college campuses from outbreaks, especially in the post-COVID-566 
19 world.  567 
 568 
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